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Abstract
It has been demonstrated that online pricing mechanisms are a viable solution for
demand side management in power systems. This study deals with the analysis and
design of a droop‐controlled low‐voltage resistive AC micro‐grid network system. Such
a system is subjected to a dynamic demand obtained from an online pricing mecha-
nism, which is proposed as a novelty in the study of micro‐grids. This mechanism is
derived from a variation of the Stackelberg game, which includes the use of incentive
strategies. First, a configuration in which a supplier announces an incentive function
and n‐consumers’ reaction to the resulting personalised price is presented. Then, a
detailed stability analysis of the micro‐grid is presented as a result of the interaction
with the aforementioned online pricing mechanism. The units of the micro‐grid
(generators as the supplier and loads as the consumers) operate under either conven-
tional or bounded droop control. The novelty of the approach is that it bridges the gap
between the physical and the market layers of the problem. The ways in which the
existence of multiple equilibrium points is guaranteed for both the consumer's load and
the supplier's announced incentive are shown. A detailed design process for the profit
functions of the players is shown in conjunction with the parameter selection for their
implementation. Finally, simulations that demonstrate the system stability and its
convergence to different equilibria are implemented under scenarios with one and
multiple consumers.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In electrical power systems, the implementation of real‐time
pricing mechanisms represents a viable way to shift demand
during peak times, thus improving efficiency without
compromising the functioning of the generation and distri-
bution systems themselves. The general purpose of these
mechanisms is to facilitate the supplier means to charge
more when the generation costs are higher, and conversely,
to let the consumer know when the price has decreased and
it is more convenient to carry out more power‐demanding
tasks. The underlying assumption is that both the con-
sumers and the suppliers are rational agents and have the
objective of maximising their profits. Under such an
assumption, a change in price results in a change of con-
sumption. The implementation of effective dynamic pricing
methods remains an open problem and introduces chal-
lenges such as global optimality for both suppliers and
consumers, uncertainties in their behaviours and preferences,
and more importantly, safe operation of the electrical sys-
tems when subjected to such methods. This last issue is the
main motivation of this work; as we will reiterate later, most
literature about dynamic pricing does not focus on the
analysis of the impact on stability when implementing such
mechanisms onto a realistic physical electrical system.
Furthermore, since the game‐theoretic Stackelberg approach
has been proposed for this kind of systems before, we
differentiate our work by introducing the concept of
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incentive strategies, which briefly explained, allow the in-
clusion of offers and other functions for the price into the
pricing scheme.
1.1 | Problem statement
The focus of this study consists in providing a clear insight into
the interaction between the physical and market dynamics of
the online pricing problem. The main purpose is to obtain a
better understanding of how to implement such a mechanism
and how to predict its impact on the physical system. This is
achieved by performing an analysis of an industrial low‐voltage
resistive micro‐grid system, where both the generators and the
loads are in the grid‐forming mode (droop controlled units), as
required in modern power systems, and the load demand is
subject to a pricing mechanism from the corresponding
leader–follower market structure. We propose and adopt a
Stackelberg approach with incentive strategies and a related
closed‐loop configuration that enables the implementation.
However, a detailed analysis for both the system stability and
the game operation is necessary to obtain the conditions that
ensure the correct operation of the whole integrated system.
1.2 | Main contributions
As a first result, we propose a novel pricing mechanism, novel
in micro‐grid literature, which is based on a Stackelberg game
involving incentive strategies. A characterisation of the equi-
librium points is derived. Secondly, we present the conditions
for stability of the resistive micro‐grid model. The underlying
assumption is that every generator and (industrial) load is
interfaced with the micro‐grid through a power inverter that
operates under the P‐V droop control (resistive droop), and
the loads receive a power reference value given by a pricing
scheme. The implementation of the proposed scheme is
further simplified by adopting a P‐V bounded droop
controller. Numerical implementations are carried out, where
the strategic competition between the consumer and the fol-
lower is shown. Convergence to different equilibrium points
for different incentive strategies is also illustrated. A way in
which the parameters can be selected for its application is
likewise delineated.
1.3 | Reviewed literature
This study is an extension of the study in [1], where we pro-
posed a normalised game for a single AC micro‐grid. The
formulation for the supplier and consumer models used here is
introduced in [2] and used also in [3]. The fundamental theo-
retical concepts for the Stackelberg game are explained in [4],
while the variation of such games with the inclusion and
formulation of the incentive strategy was originally introduced
in [5]. Examples of the use of the Stackelberg equilibrium for
demand management problems are found in [6–10] and [11],
where [6, 7] focus mainly on electric vehicle charge manage-
ment and [8] demonstrates its feasibility numerically. The ex-
istence of equilibrium points using game theoretic approaches
including the Stackelberg equilibrium is demonstrated in [9,
10]; in [11] the Stackelberg approach is used in conjunction
with evolutionary algorithms for online pricing schemes. The
use of incentives on micro‐grids has been previously studied in
[3] and, opposed to the work presented, is implemented as a
reward to the consumer for participating in an online pricing
scheme.
Regarding the physical plant, the resistive micro‐grid
network dynamics are introduced and analysed in [12, 13],
the derivation of the system's conductance matrix in [14], and
its characteristics and interpretation as a loopy Laplacian ma-
trix is explained in [15]. Such dynamics are subjected to a
quadratic droop control in [16].
The approximation of the demand response as a first‐order
dynamics is introduced in [17]; examples of this for households
and businesses can be found in [18–20]. A cost function for
electricity generation is presented in [21], which is used regu-
larly in the literature, such as in [3]. A formulation for the price
of energy as a proportional function of the total demand from
all the users is also proposed in [21]; other examples of this
practice are found in [22, 23]. For the sake of practicality, the
linear price function and generation cost function used here
have been based and adopted on the ones from [17].
Although the use of the Stackelberg equilibrium in
demand‐side management for micro‐grids is already in the
literature [6–11], to the best of our knowledge, the majority
of studies that make use of it do not take into account the
stability of the physical systems where such schemes are
applied [6–11].
The key novelties of the proposed methodology compared
to the existing literature are (i) the extension of the analysis in
[1] to a more realistic model of a low‐voltage resistive network
system, (ii) the direct calculation of the steady‐state gain for the
consumer response in the game by employing the derived
profit function, and this represents a novelty if compared to
[1], (iii) different from [6–11], the inclusion of the incentive
strategy as a means for a personalised price function, (iv) the
integration of the electrical system, which integrates a droop‐
control dynamic structure for each unit with the game‐
theoretical part of the problem, and (v) the stability analysis
of the system including an extension for the case with the
bounded droop control [24, 25], which leads to simplified
stability conditions.
According to the authors' knowledge, this is the first time
that a droop‐controlled resistive micro‐grid is subjected
directly to a game‐theoretic pricing scheme, thus paving the
way for the application of game theory‐based intelligent
demand‐side management in future distribution systems.
1.4 | Notation preliminaries
Given the one‐dimensional vector x ∈ Rn with individual
elements xi ∈ R, where i¼ 1; 2;…; n, we denote
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½x� ¼ diagðxÞ ¼ diagðxiÞ ∈ Rn�n as the associated square di-
agonal matrix with the elements of vector x in the diagonal
entries. Let us review the property ½x�−1 ¼ ½x−1i �. Let 0n�n
denote a n� n matrix with all entries equal to zero and 1n�1 be
a column vector of n elements with all entries equal to one.
2 | MICRO‐GRID MODEL
In this section, we introduce the dynamic models of both the
micro‐grid network and the droop controlled units (generators
and loads).
2.1 | Network modelling review
The topology of our micro‐grid network is represented by a
connected, undirected and weighted graph GðV; EÞ, where
V ¼ f1; 2;…;ng is the set of nodes (vertices). We divide the
set of nodes in loads VL ¼ f1; 2;…; lg and generators
VG ¼ fl þ 1; l þ 2;…; ng, where V ¼ VG ∪VL, l is the
number of load nodes and n is the total number of nodes. The
set of edges E ⊆ V � V is the set of unordered pairs fi; jg in
consideration of the distribution lines, which are assumed to be
resistive. Let A ∈ Rn�n denote the adjacency matrix of graph
G, where its ijth element Aij is the corresponding edge rep-
resented by a conductance 1=Rij between nodes i and j. The
set N i refers to the neighbouring nodes j of node i, where
N i ∈ V : fi; jg ∈ E.
2.2 | Resistive micro‐grid model
The micro‐grid model under consideration has a low‐voltage
configuration, also known as a resistive micro‐grid. The sys-
tem is considered as a network of load nodes and generator
nodes as shown in Figure 1, where the supplier is considered to
be the owner of such generators and each consumer is rep-
resented by a load node. Note that the main grid is considered
as a generator. The network is assumed to be resistive, namely
the impedance of the line, which is usually resistive‐inductive
and is dominated by the resistive component; hence the
reactive power is neglected [12].
The micro‐grid is considered to be connected to the main
grid that contributes power when the demand is higher than
the supply provided by the generators; in the network topol-
ogy, the main grid is considered as an additional node. How-
ever, the results explained here also apply for the case when the
micro‐grid is islanded.
The power equation of a node i, as a function of its
adjacent nodes' voltages in a resistive micro‐grid is given by
















where V i is the voltage on node i, Pi is the node power, Rij is
the resistance of the line that connects nodes i and j, Rii is the
shunt resistance of node i, and ϕij is the phase difference
between nodes i and j. Assuming standard decoupling
approximation [3, 16], namely that the phase ϕij has values
near to zero, we obtain for the node power Pi the following
non‐linear expression:
















The power of all the nodes of the network is given by the
following non‐linear expression:
P ¼ ½V �GV ; ð3Þ
where P and V are vectors containing all the nodes' powers
and voltages, respectively, and G is the conductance matrix
[14] that is derived from the network's Laplacian. Let us
briefly explain some of the properties of G in the next
subsection.
2.3 | Definition and properties of the
conductance matrix
Let A denote the adjacency matrix of the micro‐grid network.






while the Laplacian L of A is obtained as L ≔ D − A. Note
that, although apparent in A, the self‐loops in the topology
represented by the shunt conductances Aii ¼ 1=Rii ¼ gi do
not appear in L. For this reason, we recur to the conductance
matrix G, which has the form of a loopy Laplacian matrix [15]
and is defined as G ≔ Lþ ½fAiigni¼1�. The conductance matrix
G has the following properties: its ijth element gij ¼ −1=Rij
and its diagonal elements gii ¼ 1=Rii þ
P
j∈N i1=Rij ¼ gi −
P
j∈N igij . If there is no connection between two nodes i and j,
namely j ∉N i, then gij ¼ 0. If node i does not contain a shunt
conductance, then gi ¼ 0. Note that G as a loopy Laplacian
F I GURE 1 Resistive micro‐grid in a network representation,
comprising loads (blue circles) and generators (red squares), resistive
distribution lines, and shunt conductances
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matrix [15], makes the system dynamics (3) resemble a non‐
linear consensus dynamics [26].
2.4 | Additional model conventions
It is important to mention that the power injection Pi is
positive for generators and negative for loads. The node
sequence in the proposed network topology consists of the
loads first and then the generators and the main grid, yielding a
voltage vector V ¼ ½V 1;V 2;…;V l;V lþ1;V lþ2;…;V n�
T ,
where l is the number of loads in the network, and the nth
node corresponds to the main grid. We denote the power
contributed by the main grid that the network is connected to
as Pmg ¼ Pn.
2.5 | P‐V droop controller
Following the architecture of modern smart grids [27], it is
considered that the micro‐grid is dominated by inverter‐ and
rectifier‐interfaced units, that is, both generators and loads,
operating under the droop control concept to support the grid.
Due to the resistive nature of low‐voltage AC micro‐grids, the
P‐V droop controller should be adopted [28]; hence, the
voltage dynamics for every node take the following form:
τv _V ¼ ðV �1n�1 − V Þ − kðP − PsetÞ; ð4Þ
where τv ¼ diagðτviÞ and k¼ diagðkiÞ are diagonal matrices
containing all the nodes' voltage time constants and power
droop coefficients, respectively, V � is the rated voltage value
and Pset is a vector representation of the reference power either
demanded or generated that is set for each node by a super-
visory controller.
The vector Pset contains consumption rated values PLratedi ,
∀i∈VL. For configurations where the main grid is included,
Psetmg ¼ P
Lrated
mg ¼ 0 in order to supply any additional demand to
the micro‐grid or absorb any excess generation. For practicality
and for generalisation, we are including such nodes for the
remainder of this manuscript. Substituting (3) in (4), we obtain
the dynamics for the resistive network as follows:
_V ¼ −τ−1v V − kτ
−1
v ½V �GV þ τ
−1
v V
�1n�1 þ kτ−1v P
set: ð5Þ
Now we are ready to state our problem formulation.
3 | PROBLEM FORMULATION
We will incorporate a novel Stackelberg pricing scheme in the
field of micro‐grids where we consider the existence of a
supplier of electricity and l‐consumers. The supplier can be
represented by a distribution network operator (DNO) or an
independent system operator (ISO) that possesses a distributed
set of generators. The set of consumers are represented by the
controllable responsive load nodes included in (5). The gen-
erators take various Pset values, obtained by a supervisory
controller or a maximum power point tracking algorithm that
concurrently generate different costs to the supplier, triggering
a change of price. As a consequence, this shifts the demand in
the consumer load. Such a change of Pset in the supplier's
generators exemplifies a variation of the power outputted by
renewable resources.
Both suppliers and consumers are modelled to be price‐
taking, profit‐maximising agents [2, 3]. We refer to profit in
monetary terms as the remainder of the earnings minus the
costs of generating/consuming power. In order to maximise
their profit, the supplier wants to use a price as large as
possible and the consumers want to consume as much as they
can afford at the announced price. The output of the supplier
is the price Λ, which is determined by a function Γð⋅Þ called an
incentive strategy, and the output of the consumer is a shift on
consumption Dseti . These are selected as the quantities that
maximise their profit functions ΠS and ΠC , respectively [2].
We have now defined both the pricing scheme and the
micro‐grid network dynamics (5). We will use the announced
price and the decided demand to obtain the stability conditions
for the integrated system in a closed‐loop configuration; this
includes the droop control, load dynamics, and the tension
between the supplier and consumers.
4 | MAIN RESULTS
In this section, first we make a brief introduction to the pricing
mechanism and explain our proposed variation. Second, we
explain how the physical model is subjected to the outcome of
the price change and obtain the conditions for stability. Third,
we formulate in detail the equations involved and demonstrate
the existence and expression for the resulting equilibrium
points. Finally, we show the influence of such equilibrium
points on the dynamics of the physical system.
4.1 | Consumer and supplier functions
Having described the physical dynamics and the problem
formulation, let us continue with the game theoretical part of
our problem. For the sake of brevity and with some abuse of
notation, let us denote the game and the ways in which outputs
Λ and Dseti are calculated as







for the supplier and





vðDseti Þ − ΛPC ; ∀i∈VG
ð7Þ
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for each consumer, where PS is the total power supplied by the
supplier, namely PS ¼
P
i∈VGPi and PC is the power consumed
by a consumer i, that is, PC ¼ PLratedi þD
set
i ; ∀i ∈VL. The
earnings of the supplier is denoted by the product ΛPS and the
money paid by the consumer as ΛPC . The value function of a
consumer in the grid is denoted by vð⋅Þ, which represents the
value obtained by utilising a quantity of electricity. Analogously,
the supplier has a production cost function cð⋅Þ. We assume
that such values and cost functions monotonically increase and
are concave and convex, respectively [2, 3]. The inclusion of
both simultaneous maximisation problems motivates the use of
game‐theoretical concepts such as the Stackelberg game equi-
librium, which we will analyse whilst we fully formulate the
profit functions of the game in the following section.
4.2 | Stackelberg game formulation
The Stackelberg game refers to a hierarchical structure, ac-
cording to which there is a leader and there are followers (in
our case a supplier and consumers, respectively). Our system
set‐up accommodates such structures where the leader plays
first, and the output of the consumer depends on the
announced output of the supplier. The supplier in turn has
selected its output as the best one from a set.
Unlike in a standard Stackelberg game, setting the output
of the leader to be a function enables the existence of multiple
equilibrium points [1, 5]. This allows the follower to decide an
output that aligns with its necessities. This is the main
advantage of this variation of the game, where instead of a
unique equilibrium point, the follower can select its best
response from the multiple options yielded by the announced
incentive—all while the game is at an equilibrium.
For the sake of tractability, let us define the incentive
strategy Γð⋅Þ based on the following assumption, although
without loss of generality, other types of strategies/functions
can be selected in a similar manner.
Assumption 1 The incentive strategy Γð⋅Þ is a linear
function and is given by
ΓðPLi Þ ≔ Λi ¼ γP
L
i ; ð8Þ
where γ is a positive scalar gain. The endogenous
variable PLi is the power consumed by load i that is
being measured before the game is played.
The above can be interpreted as a function for a person-
alised price Λi that depends on how much power each con-
sumer is using. In simpler terms, the aforementioned strategy
can represent an offer that incentivises consumption, where
the offer can take the form of the proposed Γð⋅Þ function. This
is a sensible assumption, since the price would be calculated
proportionally to the demand, in the same spirit as in the
literature about demand management [21], incentive strategies
[1, 22], and dynamic pricing [23].
The gain γ is defined as strictly positive in our set‐up since
a negative value would represent the supplier paying the con-
sumer. For consistency and for the remainder of this study we
will refer to γ as the incentive value.
Let us introduce the quantity PG, which is the total power
supplied by the supplier's generators in the network. This does
not include the main grid in node n, namely PG ¼
P
i∈VGnnPi.
The power lost in the distribution lines of the network Ploss is
the remainder of all the power generated minus the sum of






Remark 1 For the sake of simplicity, we use the above
expression to obtain a measure of the power losses.





i gii; we avoid the use of such an
expression since it involves the system's state vector.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, from (8), the money paid by




i Þ and the






; both quantities are
equal to the price times the respective power consumption/
supply. The remaining elements of (6) and (7) are explained as
follows: We define both cost and value functions of the sup-
plier and consumers, respectively, as










where it is clear that cð⋅Þ and vð⋅Þ are convex and concave,
respectively, αG is a scalar gain directly associated with the cost
of running/operating the supplier's own network generators,
and αmg is associated with the cost of borrowing power from
the main grid. Both positive scalars are selected and derived
exogenously according to various factors such as market
conditions, time of the year etc. Analogously, αCi represents
each consumer's own preference for consuming power. As
their names suggest, the cost and value functions represent
monetary quantities for the players and the above gains are
used to also adjust such functions' units. All of the above yields









− cðγ; PG;Pmg; PlossÞ;
arg max
Dseti








for the supplier and each of the consumers, respectively, where
the supplier computes and announces an incentive γ that results
in l output prices Λi. Based on this, the consumers calculate a
power shift Dseti . The characterisation of a Stackelberg equilib-
rium for the game (11) is established in the following:
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Theorem 1 Let Assumption 1 hold and consider the
cost and value functions (9)–(10) in the maximisation
problem (11). The Stackelberg game yields the







− PLratedi : ð13Þ
Proof Due to the concavity of (10), the follower's
maximum is obtained by taking the derivative of ΠC in








− γPLi ¼ 0: ð14Þ
The derivative (14) yields a function of both player outputs
as in a standard Stackelberg game, from (8), and solving for
Dseti in (14) yields the conditions in (12)–(13). □
The game is played every determined period of time T S.
The resulting Dseti from the maximisation problems (11) is then
filtered through the first‐order system (15), feeding back the
consumptions as will be explained in Section 4.3.
Now that the pricing mechanism has been defined,
emphasis will be given to establishing the stability conditions
for the physical system, where the input is the shift in con-
sumption Dseti from above.
4.3 | Closed‐loop configuration
After each consumer i has decided how much to shift its
consumption, namely all Dseti values for each load node have
been outputted by the game, these are reflected in the micro‐
grid system by feeding them back into it. Although a decision
of how much power a load should be consuming is taken at
every time step when a price is announced, the load introduces






i ; ∀i ∈ VL; ð15Þ
where τi ∈ R>0 is the time constant of the system and ΔPLi is
our new consumption shift state. This represents the con-
sumers' response while they shift their consumption before
reaching their selected value Dseti [1, 17]. From (15), it is
straightforward to show that at steady‐state ΔPLi
ss
¼Dseti . A
similar demand response modelling is often found in the
literature, such as in [18, 19].
The way in which our system is subjected to the price
change results from integrating the dynamics (5)–(15). This




The added states ΔPLi are subtracted to their respective load





i if i ∈VL. In other words, the resulting
shift of demand given a new price is reflected by modifying the
rated load values. For each of the load nodes, dynamics (5) are






















Vi�; ∀i ∈ VL:
ð16Þ
For the rest of the nodes, namely the generator nodes
and the main grid node, their dynamics are left unchanged as
in (5). For the sake of completeness, let us write their dy-
namics as



















V i�; ∀i ∈ VG:
ð17Þ
Now that we have the full dynamics of the system subject
to the change of demand due to an announced price, we can
perform a stability analysis.
4.4 | Closed‐loop stability
Due to the non‐linear nature of (15)–(17), in the sequel, we
recur to the method of linearising around an equilibrium. This
provides local stability results.
Calculating the Jacobian of (15)–(17), we analyse the sys-
tem under the assumption of the existence of an equilibrium
point; we follow the methodology for resistive networks as in
[16] and references therein. We also resort to [29], Theorem 1],
which states that a non‐linear circuit system is to be studied
near the equilibrium via linearisation for V ∈ R>0; this is true
for our case.
Assumption 2 For constant inputs Dseti ∀i ∈ VL and
Pseti ∀i ∈ VG with P
set
mg ¼ 0, there exists an equilib-







(15)–(17), where �V i ∈ R>0 and Δ�P
L
i ∈ R.
Although the droop control model is standard, the above
assumption might seem conservative. We utilise it for
simplicity as a means to approximate the position of the system
eigenvalues. This assumption is relaxed in Section 4.5,
Assumption 3. We should mention that in a practical scenario,
the droop controller has to be designed in a way such that it
outputs positive voltage values [30, 31]. Additionally, the fact
that the output voltages are at an equilibrium other than zero
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implies that the system operates correctly. We demonstrate
stability from the existence of the equilibrium with the
Jacobian.
Theorem 2 Let Assumption 2 hold and let a shift on
consumption ΔPLi in each load node be given. Then










�V i − �V j
Rij
�













< 0; for i∈VL:
ð18Þ
Proof Calculating the Jacobian of system (15)–(16) with
respect to the states V i and ΔPLi , yields the following
ðnþ lÞ � ðnþ lÞ matrix:
(19)
where τ−1 ¼ diagðτ−1i Þ is an l � l matrix, and J
V is the n� n
matrix corresponding to the Jacobian of the open‐loop voltage
dynamics (5) with respect to the state vector V :
JV ¼ −τ−1v − kτ
−1
v ½
�V �Gþ ½G �V �
  �
; ð20Þ


















To obtain the stability conditions, the eigenvalues of our
linearised system J should be obtained. However, due to the
size of J , the analytic calculation of the eigenvalues is a
daunting task. Let us employ the Gershgorin disc theorem to
approximate the position of such eigenvalues within the
complex plane.
From Assumption 2, a disc Δi can be defined for each row
i in J . This will encircle the position of the eigenvalue λi. Such a




At the equilibrium point, for the ith voltage state of




















































Figure 2 illustrates a possible configuration of such discs.
Taking into account the properties of G mentioned in Sec-















































; if i ∈VL:
ð26Þ
For the system to be stable, the eigenvalues have to be
positioned in the left‐hand side of the complex plane, namely
RðλiÞ < 0. To guarantee this, the entirety of Gershgorin discs
should be in the left‐hand‐side of the complex plane, namely

































< 0; for i ∈ VL;
F I GURE 2 Gershgorin disc configuration example, the centre and
radius for the ith disc of J
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and simplifying the expressions above, the two conditions in
(18) are obtained. Additionally, from J , the ΔPLi states yield l
stable eigenvalues λi ¼ −1=τi, which is a straightforward result
since the time constants are always positive. □
Remark 2 In the case where all of the node voltages
have approximately the same value at the steady‐state,
that is, �Vi ≈ �Vj, and the shunt conductances are small
enough to be neglected 1=Rii ≈ 0, condition (18) is
simplified even further, yielding
ki < 1; ð27Þ
which is a stronger assumption to the case studied. However,
in practice ki ¼ pV �i =P
rated
i ∀ i, where p is a percentage de-
viation of the node voltage that corresponds to 100% deviation
of the real power, according to the droop control concept. The
above result (27) yields the inequality pV � < Pratedi , which
aligns with the low voltage network assumption.
4.5 | Implementing a bounded droop
control architecture
It should be highlighted that in a real scenario, it is a
requirement that the instantaneous node voltages remain
within a given set, usually V i ∈ ðV *i − ΔV ;V
�
i þ
ΔV Þ ∀ t ≥ 0, where ΔV is a deviation value of around 5%–
10% from the rated voltage, namely ΔV ¼ 0:05V * . Then,
according to [24], we can use the bounded droop controller
(BDC) to guarantee such outputs. This is based on the
bounded integral control theory from [25]; a characteristic of
this is that it still maintains the linear P‐V controller approach
[28] while generating a bounded output.
The above is achieved by introducing a second controller
state V q; hence the voltage dynamics for all the nodes take the
following form:
_V ¼ cτ−1v ðV
�1n�1 − V Þ − kð½V �GV − PsetÞð ÞV 2q; ð28Þ
_Vq ¼ −cτ−1v
V q V −V �1n�1ð Þ
ΔV 2
ðV �1n�1−V −kð½V �GV −PsetÞÞ
þ kI
�
ðV − V �1n�1Þ2
ΔV 2




where V q is a vector with the same dimensions as V and
c ¼ diagðciÞ and k
I ¼ diagðkIi Þ are matrices of positive con-
stant gains for the integral control. The yielded state vector has





addition of V q, it can be seen from (28)–(29) that the
controller is composed of a non‐linear double integrator
structure, thus acting as an oscillator [24] and fulfiling the
objective of emulating the dynamics of RMS voltage. Figure 3
illustrates the ways in which the values of the states V i and V qi
start and remain in the upper part of the ellipse formed by the
term kIððV−V *1n�1Þ2ΔV 2 þ V
2
q − 1n�1Þ in (29). The above has been
previously demonstrated in detail in [25].
The closed‐loop configuration of (28)–(29) for load nodes








−Piset þ ΔPiLÞÞV 2qi; ∀i ∈ VL;
ð30Þ
_V qi ¼ −
ci
τvi
V qi Vi − V �i
  �
ΔV 2















þ V 2qi − 1ÞV qi; ∀i ∈ VL:
ð31Þ
Similarly, for the generator nodes, the closed‐loop dy-












V qi V i − V �i
  �
ΔV 2




Vj gij − P
set
i ÞÞ þ kIi ððVi − V �i Þ
2
ΔV 2
þV 2qi − 1ÞVqi; ∀i ∈ VG: ð33Þ
The implementation of the BDC into our system dynamics
also guarantees the existence of equilibrium points within
selected bounds. With the introduction of the bounded voltage
F I GURE 3 Bounded droop controller phase portrait example
8 - GENIS MENDOZA ET AL.
dynamics, we can now relax Assumption 2 and present the
result that follows:
Assumption 3 For constant inputs Dseti ∀i ∈ VL and
Pseti ∀i ∈ VG with P
set
mg ¼ 0, there exists an equilibrium







systems (15), (28)–(33), where Δ�PLi ∈ R, �V i ∈ R>0,
�V i ∈ ðV * − ΔV ;V * þ ΔV Þ and �V qi ∈ ð−1; 1Þ.
This enables the stability conditions to be independent of
the equilibrium point values �V i and to be dependent only on
rated and tuned parameters:
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 3 hold and let a shift
on consumption ΔPLi in each load node be given; sys-
tem (15), (30)–(33) is asymptotically stable at an
equilibrium point if





Þ < 0; ∀i ∈ V: ð34Þ
Proof Denoting the V q dynamics (31), (33) as
f ðV ;V q;ΔPLÞ and calculating the Jacobian of systems
(15), (30)–(33) with respect to the states V i, V qi and




































where κ is the n� l matrix κ ¼ kτv−1; 0ðn−lÞ�l
� �T and Φ is a
n� n matrix Φ¼ ½ciV 2qi�. For the stability conditions, the ei-
genvalues λi of linearised JBDC are calculated. These are the
roots of the polynomial yielded by the determinant
jλI − JBDC j¼ jλI þ 2kIiV qi2
h i
jjλI − ΦJV jjλI þ τ−1j: ð36Þ
Using the properties of block matrices, it is trivial to see
that the nþ l eigenvalues yielded by both matrices ½2kIiV qi
2�
and τ−1 are negative and real due to the fact that all their values
are positive. Thus, it remains only to find the eigenvalues of
ΦJV. We can discard Φ and focus only on JV since all values of
ciV 2qi are positive as well.
Similar to Section 4.3, computing the Gershgorin discs





following condition is obtained by shifting the entirety of disc















�V igi < 0; ∀i ∈ V: ð37Þ
Simplifying the expression above, we can substitute �V i and
�V j to the value that yields a disc closer to the origin. The worst
case scenarios for such values are �V i ¼ V �i − ΔV and
�V j ¼ V �j þ ΔV . Doing this we obtain the sufficient condition
(34). □
Note that condition (34) can be easily checked since it does
not require the calculation of the equilibrium point.
Now that the conditions for the stability of the integrated
system have been explained, let us briefly focus on the ways in
which the outcome of the game influences the physical system
output.
After each play of the game, it can be demonstrated that
the physical dynamics' equilibrium points depend directly on
the game's output values. This can be corroborated as follows.
Remark 3 The steady‐state expression for dynamics
(15) of node i ∈ VL can be formulated as a function of
the Stackelberg equilibrium parameters, namely
V iss ¼ f ðγ; PLi ; αCiÞ: ð38Þ
Once the consumers have decided their consumption and
their demand has shifted, the dynamics (15) and (16) are
considered to be at steady‐state. From there the following
expressions are obtained:








where Pi is shorthand for the static expression (2) at the






− PLratedi : ð41Þ
This can be substituted into (39), resulting in the simplified
expression





Þ − kiPi þ V �i ; ð42Þ
which can be rewritten as the function in (38). It is worth
mentioning that the steady state of the system will change value
once the game has been played again. This is further exem-
plified in the numerical examples in the next section. The
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above derivations can be performed similarly for the system
subject to the bounded droop control presented in Section 4.5.
5 | SIMULATIONS
In this section we simulate three scenarios. In the first scenario
we show how a single load behaves when subject to the
incentive strategy. In the second, we show a configuration with
two loads, where it is shown how consumer preferences can be
modelled distinctly. Finally, in the third scenario we briefly
demonstrate the scalability of our set‐up by showing an
instance with six loads and six generators. All examples are
implemented using the closed‐loop bounded droop control
dynamics (15), (30)–(33) and the supplier and consumers
involved are subject to the maximisation problem (11). The
simulations are performed in Simulink.
In the first scenario the micro‐grid consists of the
following elements: one load (node 1), two generators (nodes 2
and 3), and the micro‐grid is connected to the main grid (node
4). The parameters are selected as in Tables 1 and 2, where the
droop coefficients are calculated in a standard fashion as
ki ¼ 0:05V �i =P
rated
i and ci ¼ πΔV=0:1kiP
rated
i for all nodes.
The network topology is given by the conductances in G from
(43). The cost function gains αG and αmg have been selected in
a way that illustrates that it is more costly to use power from
the main grid, resulting in higher incentive values when the
main grid provides power. To further illustrate the price
change, during the simulation we modify the power contrib-
uted by the supplier's generators; this is achieved by modifying
the generators' set powers to the values as in Table 1. The
initial value of the incentive is set to γ ¼ 0:036 $=W2.
In all simulations, for example purposes and without loss
of generality, we have selected the game to be played every
TS ¼ 60s in which a new γ is calculated. The consumption ΔPset1
is calculated at TC ¼ 62s, meaning that the incentive is known
by the consumer 2 s after being announced.
G¼
13:7221 −5:0000 −4:1667 −4:5455
−5:0000 14:1197 −4:3478 −4:7619
−4:1667 −4:3478 12:5245 −4:0000










Figure 4 shows the node's power plots. It can be seen that
there is an incentive change every time the generators shift
their value. As a consequence of this, a shift in the load hap-
pens depending on how high the incentive is. In particular, if
the incentive γ increases, the price increases and the consumer
reduces its consumption (making it less negative in the plot). It
can also be seen that a higher contribution by the main grid
leads to a higher price and vice versa. Finally, the plots show
TABLE 1 First scenario parameters
Pset αCi αGi Prated ki
Load 1 −6 kW 29�106 $ logðWÞ ‐ 10 kW 0.0011
Generator 1 1.9 kW at t = 0 s
0.2 kW at t = 1000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 11W2=$ 7 kW 0.0016
Generator 2 1.5 kW at t = 0 s
0.05 kW at t = 2000 s
2 kW at t = 4000 s
‐ 5 kW 0.0022
Main grid 0 kW ‐ 2W2=$ 3 kW 0.0037
TABLE 2 Fixed parameters for simulations
ci τi ΔV V *i
31.4159 3 s 11 V 220 V
F I GURE 4 Simulation of a network connected to the main grid with
one load and two varying generators
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that given a change in the generators, both the incentive and
the powers converge towards an equilibrium point. The voltage
response stays within acceptable ranges and is mainly affected
by the generator shifting as shown in Figure 5. It can be
verified that the droop control is successful and there is no
deviation larger than the 5% of the selected 220 V.
The second scenario consists of two loads (nodes 1 and 2),
two generators (nodes 3 and 4), and the main grid (node 5).
The power references are set as in Table 3. The cost and value
function gains have been re‐tuned. The latter have been set to
show that the two consumers have different interests. Such
values are selected due to the nature of their logarithmic value
function, as in (10), and will depend on the kind of concave
function selected as mentioned in Section 4.2. The topology is
expanded from the previous with the conductances from (44).
The rest of the parameters are left as in the previous
simulation.
G¼
17:5683 −5:0000 −4:1667 −4:5455 −3:8462
−5:0000 17:8234 −4:3478 −4:7619 −3:7037
−4:1667 −4:3478 16:0959 −4:0000 −3:5714
−4:5455 −4:7619 −4:0000 16:7656 −3:4483









































F I GURE 5 Voltage plots for the one load configuration
TABLE 3 Second scenario parameters
Pset αCi αGi Prated ki
Load 1 −3.5 kW 29�106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 6 kW 0.0018
Load 2 −3.5 kW 20�106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 6 kW 0.0018
Generator 1 1.9 kW at t = 0 s
0.1 kW at t = 1000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 9.5W2=$ 7 kW 0.0016
Generator 2 1.5 kW at t = 0 s
0.05 kW at t = 2000 s
2 kW at t = 4000 s
‐ 6 kW 0.0022
Main grid 0 kW ‐ 7.5W2=$ 3 kW 0.0037
F I GURE 6 Simulation of a network connected to the main grid with
two loads and two varying generators
F I GURE 7 Voltage plots for the two load configuration
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Figure 6 shows the second power plots. As before, it can
be seen that there is convergence towards different equilibrium
points for different γ. The different consumer value gains αCi
result in distinct steady states despite their equal rated and set
consumption values, corroborating their influence on the
steady‐state value from (41). The voltage plots for the second
scenario are shown in Figure 7. As expected, the inclusion of
another load lowers the voltages overall. However, the 5%
deviation from the set voltages is still satisfied by the droop
controller.
The third scenario illustrates the power and consumption
response of a micro‐grid that consists of six interconnected
loads (nodes 1 to 6), six generators (nodes 7–12), and is
connected to the main grid (node 13). The parameters for
the simulation are adopted as in Table 4 and its topology
and respective conductances are shown in Figure 8. From
Figure 9 it can be seen that, as in previous examples, the
rationality of the consumers is captured as they react to the
price accordingly. We should emphasise that the consumers
have similar rated and set power values, and they shift to
different values because we have selected a different αCi for
each. To avoid repetition, we do not provide the voltage
TABLE 4 Third scenario parameters
Pset αCi αGi Prated ki
Load 1 −3.5 kW 29� 106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 6 kW 0.0018
Load 2 −3.5 kW 20� 106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 6 kW 0.0018
Load 3 −3.6 kW 18� 106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 5.5 kW 0.0022
Load 4 −4.1 kW 10� 106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 5 kW 0.0027
Load 5 −3.9 kW 7� 106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 6 kW 0.0016
Load 6 −3.7kW 3� 106 $ =logðWÞ ‐ 5.7 kW 0.0014
Generator 1 1.9 kW at t = 0 s
0.1 kW at t = 1000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 20W2=$ 7 kW 0.0016
Generator 2 1.5 kW at t = 0 s
0.05 kW at t = 2000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 5 kW 0.0022
Generator 3 1.9 kW at t = 0 s
0.1 kW at t = 1000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 5 kW 0.0022
Generator 4 1.5 kW at t = 0 s
0.05 kW at t = 2000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 6 kW 0.0018
Generator 5 1.9 kW at t = 0 s
0.1 kW at t = 1000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 8 kW 0.0014
Generator 6 1.5 kW at t = 0 s
0.05 kW at t = 2000 s
2 kW at t = 3000 s
‐ 7 kW 0.0016
Main grid 0 kW ‐ 4.5W2=$ 3 kW 0.0037
F I GURE 8 Graph topology corresponding to the third simulation
scenario, where each edge represents the conductance between each micro‐
grid element
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response due to the similarity with the previous scenarios.
Additionally, the system response remains stable, reaffirming
both the feasibility and the scalability of our setup.
It is worth noting that in these simulations, the rational
behaviour for both the supplier and the consumer has been
captured: When the main grid contributes more power, its
higher cost forces the supplier to increase the incentive
which results in higher prices; in response, the consumer
lowers its load to a point that brings it a better profit given
the current price. The converse case that occurs when the
contribution from the main grid is low, leading to a decrease
of the price and an increase of the loads, is also captured at
the latter part of the simulations. As a final note, the
simulation results for the system without using the bounded
droop control are very similar to the ones presented and are
not shown here for the sake of brevity. However, it is easy
to check that condition (18) holds based on the parameters
used above.
6 | CONCLUSION
We have implemented a game‐theoretical approach for online
pricing on a low‐voltage resistive micro‐grid, bridging the gap
between the market and physical components of the problem.
We have proposed a game model that captures the rationality
of the energy consumers. We have provided asymptotic
stability conditions and shown how the parameters and
functions can be adopted for the implementation of the online
pricing mechanism. We have provided numerical examples
that illustrate the ways in which the game and dynamics can be
implemented, successfully capturing the rationality of the
players involved together with the physical micro‐grid, while
also demonstrating stability at different equilibrium points.
Future work will involve the inclusion of different functions
for the incentive strategy, studying the bounds for the gains in
both value and cost functions and the analytical conditions
that lead to a consensus on price and demand and that ensure
a non‐oscillating response.
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